Abstract-This article documents the adoption of computer technology by a civil engineering services and construction company in Mexico at the time that it became the first Mexican multinational enterprise.
Introduction
This brief article records the development of the evolution in the use of computer technology by the civil engineering firm ‗Ingenieros Civiles Asociaciados S.A. de C.V.' (ICA). ICA's rapid and consistent growth has made it Mexico's first major multinational company. Its first computer, an IBM 1130, was installed within its Aereofoto business in 1966. Driven by ICA's internal market system, use of the computer soon shifted from engineering to administrative applications, particularly cost accounting and payroll. After winning a major external engineering contract in 1968 the firm ordered a larger CDC 3300 computer as the foundation for an ambitious computer services business. However the computer was unreliable and the fledgling business failed to win many internal or external customers. A push into the fashionable -computer utility‖ market failed to get off the ground. By 1972 a combination of reduced ambition and the installation of an IBM 360 yielded a stable but conservative subsidiary focused on a handful of applications.
The history of computing has traditionally been dominated by technological histories of key machines or systems and by business histories of major hardware companies. As Michael Mahoney observed, the field absorbed an implicitly -machine centered‖ master narrative.
1 In recent years, however, attention has turned toward the use of computers in particular social contexts. This reflects a broader turn toward examination of use and users within both science studies and the history of technology. 2 However early computers were purchased, configured, and applied not by isolated individuals but by large organizations. Attention to use therefore requires us to combine several distinct perspectives. First, we must be willing to follow the suggestion of JoAnne Yates in studying organizations, rather than individuals, as users of computer technology. 3 Yates also makes a persuasive case for the need to consider entire industries, rather than isolated firms, as agents of computer adoptions and has documented to role of trade associations in creating a consensus on the nature and proper application of computers within an industry. 4 But we must not forget that organizations are made up of people, and that institutions exist within the minds of individuals and are reproduced and enacted through in their daily interactions. Hence it is also important to consider the role of different occupational groups and practices in the evolution of computer use.
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Shifting our focus to computer technology in use poses other kinds of challenge to the existing literature. A standard computer, such as an IBM 1401, might be used in very different ways in different industries. As James W. Cortada has shown, it is possible to write the history of computer usage as a collection of dozens of loosely connected stories covering different industries. 6 Likewise, by the 1960s the international computer industry was dominated by a handful of firms, mostly American. But every country has its own story of computer use and adoption, and it cannot be assumed that adoption of similar hardware in two nations implies that both countries would use make similar use of computer technology or experience equivalent results.
As a case study of early computer use in a Mexican engineering firm this paper provides a small contribution toward meeting Mahoney's daunting challenge to explore the -Histories of Computing(s)‖ in all their richness. 7 The few detailed studies of computer use in particular industries have thus far tended to focus on financial organizations. 8 Likewise almost nothing has been written about any aspect of the history of computing in Mexico, and indeed Latin America as a whole has received little more attention. 9 This article details the introduction and diffusion of computer technology within ICA. Details are provided of how purchases were made, benefits to the company, challenges to make the technology work, the transformation in the use of the technology, ways in which computerization altered organizational and events that led to the creation of an independent computer services company. Faced with a dearth of surviving company records, what follows is based on interviews with participants involved in the setting up and running the computer centers for ICA. 10 Where possible these accounts have been crossed referenced with publicly available information. The draft was also crossed checked by all participants.
Early Mexican Computing
Mexico's first computers were installed for academic and governmental use. (computer analyst, 1965 -1973 Systems Manager, 1974 -1984 , and Bernardo Bátiz Echavarria (Operations Manager, 1964 -1984 It is interesting to note that higher education had not prepared anyone for the intricacies of electronic computing. Indeed at a time when there were a handful of computers in Mexico (accessed by a small elite), even the engineers teaching the course for IBM found the content totally new and they learned by reading manuals beforehand and then through feedback with other participants as the courses evolved. 18 Moreover, IBM support took the form of ‗service' and ‗support' engineers which were often deployed full time to the new site (particularly after a new installation). However they only looked after the hardware and answered very specific queries. The development of data processing applications was very much left to the customer. The assembler-based administrative applications soon filled up and saturated the capacity of the 1401. 19 At the same time there was an expectation within SOP's middle and top ranks (particularly Fernando Espinoza, the head of the Proyects and Laboratories Bureau) that computer technology could also be used to develop engineering applications. A couple of trials developing simulations in the 1401 convince them confidence. 20 The first major project was to be developed by staff at the Structures Department and aimed to mechanize photogrammetry capabilities for the design and planning of new highways by storing topographic information on punched cards. This was along the lines of similar processes already in place in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland (which Piña and two others observed first hand during a two month tour of Europe). It was expected that computer applications would minimize the time and increase the accuracy in the geometry to calculate the volume of earth to be moved in highway construction. The ultimate goal however was a substantial increase in the capacity to design and plan for new highways, roads and bridges and thus respond to the central government's policy of enhancing the country's infrastructure. 21 The decision to go ahead with computerization of photogrammetry was taken towards the end of 1962.
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Given the lack of capacity at the 1401, this resulted in the General Services Department leasing an IBM 1620 to sit alongside the 1401. 23 The 1620 was selected as it was considered the only one on offer which was both of ‗modest' size and highly reliable. 24 Preparations for the 1620 included IBM training some eight to ten engineers (including Piña) in FORTRAN. Of these five were selected as the Programming Unit 25 :
three of them were promising recent graduates from UNAM (including Piña). The two others were more senior and experienced in the design of roads and highways.
During early trials after the pilot project was underway, people around the project were skeptical and they consistently voiced their discontent that reports were missing relevant information. 26 At one point and following a printers' breakdown, the head of the area advised that he was cancelling the computerization project. This announcement was immediately followed by an uproar from rank and file who were by then reluctant to return to manual methods.
Programming staff soon discovered that by changing a small number of punched cards a process initially thought of as one of labor substitution and mechanization became one of optimization: the combination of photogrammetric information together with electronic calculus achieved greater efficiency in the vertical and horizontal alignment of the highway. This resulted in savings in the order of 10 to 15 percent of the overall expected cost of the construction. A substantial amount indeed, which more than compensated the cost of the additional effort to input data in punched card form.
According to one estimate, there were 250 computer centers in Mexico in 1967. 27 This grew to 1,200 by 1976, most of which were deployed in the cities of Monterrey and Mexico, sites of rapid urbanization.
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The same source claimed that the total annual cost of electronic data processing increased from 1.5 to 6.7 In 1965, when it purchased Aerofoto, growth through acquisition was a new strategy for ICA. However, such growth did not respond to the pursuit of a ‗corporatist' strategy. 35 Rather than building a multidivision company, ICA aimed to maximize capital formation by maximizing the reinvestment of after-tax profits and reducing tax payments by obscuring a contract's net profit inside a web of seemingly independent companies. 36 This resulted in the group being run by a number of ‗divisional viceroys' (who had ultimate say within the companies under their control), hindered the development of standardized processes, procedures and practices, and gave no incentives to share common facilities (such as accounting, central purchasing of stationary or computing equipment). 37 Blurred organizational boundaries also meant 33 Ten of these were grouped into building and construction (‗Empresas Constructoras'), four related to technical services (‗Servicios Técnicos'), three into auxiliary services to construction (‗Servicios Auxiliares a la Construcción'), one in real estate management (‗Inmobiliarias') and eleven in heavy construction engineering (‗Industria de Mécanica Pesada'). that as part of their responsibilities (and pay) junior and senior managers could offer their services to three or four companies within a division at any one time. 38 But for simplicity in what follows we assume strict organizational boundaries.
Shortly after its acquisition by ICA, Aerophoto secured a hefty contract to draw topographic maps of large irrigation areas based on photogrammetry. 39 San Miguel oversaw the running of Aereofoto while a permanent general manager was appointed. He and an Aereofoto technician, Alberto Villasana, approached
Piña regarding the possibility of deploying in Aereofoto a system similar to that at SOP. 40 Villasana was then made responsible of updating the photogrammetry equipment and staff training while Piña, acting as external consultant, with the task of overseeing the selection of the computer and programming team. 41 Soon Antonio Dovalí Ramos, an up and coming young talent within ICA, was appointed general manager of Aereofoto. Like San Miguel, he was of the view that manual processes for originating maps through the combination of aerial photographs and topographic information were extremely time consuming, tedious and prone to error. 42 For instance, correlating information required the four people involved in calculations at Aerefoto to work with 16 digit decimals in operations involving logarithms and trigonometric functions.
Since the demand for large projects at Aereofoto was influenced by requests for up to date maps and cartography, workloads were uneven and followed random patterns of intensity. This was a concern as it limited possibilities to add new, younger people to the staff at Areofoto, whose workforce was aging rapidly.
The Arrival of the IBM 1130
Towards the end of 1964 it was becoming increasingly evident to those involved in Mexican computing that second generation (transistor-based) machines such as the 1401 and 1620 would soon be replaced by third generation (micro-transistor-based) machines. 43 It was suggested that ‗the new machines could be a hundred times faster.' 44 There had also been a proliferation of manufacturers in the international scene. But the only European competitor in Mexico was GE-Bull (servicing the National University and Banamex)
while Burroughs and Honeywell were the only other US manufacturers with local servicing facilities. 45 The advent of third generation machines lead a number of people in organizations already using computers to consider upgrading their equipment. At the SOP, for instance, plans were drawn by comparing the newly launched IBM 360 with offers from other manufacturers. 46 At ICA, however, the selection strongly favored Securing the funding for the computer was an uphill struggle. ICA's hierarchy in general and Quintana in particular, were not convinced of the benefits of computer technology. Actually, Quintana remained unsure whether the acquisition of Aereofoto had made sense at all.
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In the six to eight months that followed his appointment as general manager, Dovalí had several meetings with Quintana in order to secure the computer. Quintana run ICA under a tight expenditure policy regime which -would rather repair the same [earth moving] equipment several times than purchase a new one.‖ 52 Dovalí thus argued primarily on the basis of efficiency, as Aereofoto had to continually recalculate estimates. The expenditure related to the computer was not seen as a capital investment but as an irrecoverable (i.e. sunk) cost, whose monetary value was modest. 53 Ultimately, Quintana saw the move to install a computer at Aerophoto as an experiment, which had more to do with fostering the innovativeness and ingenuity of its young engineers than any sign of modernity or keeping up with technological change. 54 This secured the second order for the machine anywhere and the first to be deployed outside the USA. 55 However, there were delays due to problems at IBM and it arrived to Aereofoto until 1966.
Even though the 1130 still required an air-conditioned room, a dust free environment, and input via punched cards, it remained small and cheap when compared with the large mainframes being deployed at banks and government offices at the time. It was also a relatively low expenditure when compared with investments in equipment and working capital made in other parts of a growing construction and heavy engineering company. 56 Moreover, the monthly rent was roughly equivalent to the monthly payroll of three senior engineers and therefore, its cost could easily be recouped by any of the usual studies and projects in which Aereofoto was involved at the time.
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The first IBM 1130 at Aereofoto, circa1966. Courtesy of Fundación ICA.
As is evident in the picture above, there were severe limitations in room that housed the first machine.
Temperature was controlled through an air-conditioning unit mounted on a window while cables were initially exposed (later covered with makeshift cardboard covers). 58 After the computer had been installed,
Piña was hired on a full-time contract by Aereofoto and named Chief of the Electronic Computer
Department (‗Jefe del Departamento de Cómputo Electrónico'). He employed ten newly graduated engineers to be trained on the job as computer programmers and analysts (all male), most of which were graduates from the National University's Faculty of Engineering and with enough experience with computing to be able to write FORTRAN. 59 The team also included four female punched card operators as well as the services of Bernardo Bátiz Echavarria, who had recently returned from doctoral courses in Operations Research at the Wharton School (thanks to ICA's scholarship program). 60 Although these defined job roles promised a clear division of labor, in practice it was fairly informal working environment.
Computer programmers and machine operators in particular shared the workload and many became a ‗jack of all trades' as ‗everybody tended to do a bit of everything'. 61 There was a great deal of camaraderie amongst specialist around the computer centre. This was in sharp contrast to the strictly hierarchical and even dictatorial organizational structure typical of Mexico in the 1960s.
José Piña Garza and Bernardo Bátiz Echavarria, both were instrumental in the running of the IBM 1130
and the purchase of the CDC 3300. September 2009.
Establishment of an Internal Service Center
Upon his arrival, Dovalí also noted to the team that, as other parts of ICA such as SOLUM, the newly created computer centre team at Aereofoto had the mandate to sell its services to other companies within the group by providing computerized support for engineering projects related to the construction of roads, highways, dams, and irrigation canals. 62 Some of these could benefit from pre-installed packages in the 1130 such as those for project management and structure cost estimates. 63 
Building that housed Aereofoto in the 1960s (Obrero Mundial # 338, Col. Narvarte). The IBM1130 was located in the second floor. September 2009
Computerization of engineering applications was a success and met everyone's expectations. 64 But an uneven flow of work threatened to leave the computer idle for long periods of time. Dovalí therefore pushed for the development of administrative applications. At the instance of Fernando Favela (vice president of the Heavy Enginering division, ‗vicepresidente de la División de Ingenería Pesada') the first of these was a program for the accounting control of construction equipment. 65 This involved keeping a tally of hourly use of earth moving equipment by different companies at different locations. These machines were owned by ICA and not the subsidiaries, and so were managed from headquarters and provided to subsidiaries at market prices. This application benefited from a pre-existing procedure based on punchedcards and electro-mechanic tabulators. 66 However, the computer program also estimated depreciation charges and kept a record of service and maintenance per machine. People were quite happy with the results, paving the way for other administrative applications of computer technology. 67 
Mechanization of engineering projects at ICA. Photogrametry capabilities for highway design included a punched card machine (towards the back). Aereofoto circa 1967. Courtesy of Fundación ICA.
In parallel with the accounting control system, the team built a payroll system for Aereofoto. It aimed to automate manual processes by updating staff turnover files and daily attendance to generate paychecks as well as debits and credits to the general ledger. The payroll was run weekly and paid in cash. This application was attractive not only because of the need to automate but because it would consume computer time at regular intervals. 68 Developing the payroll application proved to be quite a challenge for the programming team. 69 The main hurdle was that at the time the 1130 would only run FORTRAN, intended for scientific applications, rather than the administrative programming language COBOL. FORTRAN for the 1130 used floating point arithmetic and would often round up. Hence adding and multiplying subroutines were developed in order that individual checks and the ultimate accounting tally for pesos and cents was accurate. 70 Why was such a generic application developed from scratch? IBM did offer some sort of payroll application for the 1130. But IBM's software was based on US laws, requirement and 68 L.E. Maumejean, Interview, September 15, 2009. 69 To meet cash payments the main printout was a tally of how many bills and coins of each denomination had to be inserted in pay envelope. Dealing with actual cash was outsourced to a securities transport and armored truck company. Besides weekly and annual taxes, the system also had to calculate weekly and annual contributions by individuals to the national health service (‗Seguro Social') as well as aggregate bimonthly reports to it. At the end of the calendar year, companies also had to make pro-rata payments of a fixed portion of after tax profits to all employees (‗reparto de ultilidades'). Some of the companies being serviced also required ‗ad hoc' reports by project or function so they could inform their cost and management accounting systems. It was thus quite a complex and comprehensive application. Source: J. Piña Garza, Personal communication, December 2, 2009. organizational practices. Many Mexican companies (within and outside ICA) had idiosyncratic practices and requirements that made localizing US software more expensive that programming from first principles. 71 And, even in the US, the market for generalized application software had not yet developed. 72 In a parallel development, Quintana convinced General Alfonso Corona del Rosal, the newly appointed Mexico City regent (Jefe del Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1966-1970) 73 , to build a metropolitan subway system (Metro) in support of the Olympic games (1968) and Football World Cup (1970).
Moreover, that ICA would deliver in record time. 74 To support Quintana's effort, Aereofoto's programming team developed an operations research simulation programs (most in FORTRAN but some using the General Purpose System Simulator or GPSS) to estimate optimal passenger loads and train lengths of the proposed Metro. The contract was granted. But this then poised the challenge of managing a weekly payroll of up to 12,000 manual laborers. 75 Moreover, a large number of manual and construction workers were hired within short periods of time (sometimes even back to back shifts) by different companies within ICA. 76 A tax reform introduced in 1967 77 required that companies report consolidated annual income and tax withheld per worker to the Finance Ministry. No administrative system within ICA was ready for such challenge and the case was made for a second and much larger computer, better suited to administrative applications.
Scaling up Computer Capabilities
Aereophoto's computer team started the search for a new machine after ICA secured the contract to build the Metro in 1967 as this included a payroll contract for Aereofoto (granted in 1968). At the same time and in order to respond to the increased workload, a second IBM 1130 was leased. This machine had double the memory as the previous, two more removable disk units, an additional magnetic tape reader/writer (used mainly for back-ups), cables covered under ‗proper' flooring and temperature controlled through ‗more appropriate' air-conditioning.
Second IBM 1130 at Aereofoto circa 1968. This time an effort was made to house it under more suitable
conditions. Courtesy of Fundación ICA.
Aereofoto's leaders anticipated further outsourcing of payrolls, general accounting applications and project management from other firms within ICA. In January 1970 a new company was established within ICA called ‗Procesos y Sistemas de Informacion, S.A.' (PSI). The idea was for computer operations in ICA to grow into a general purpose company that ‗offered all services currently available around electronic computing'. 79 All those directly and indirectly involved at computing around Aereofoto were relocated to staff the new company, with Dovalí as general manager (‗Gerente General'), Piña as second in command (‗Subgerente General') and Bátiz Echavarria as chief operations manager (‗Jefe de operaciones'), overseeing the day to day running of computer related projects, computer selection and details of the new computer centre. 80 Leonnard Rappaport was retained as selection consultant and eventually hired as full-time member of the PSI team. 81 Several manufacturers with local representatives were considered and these included IBM, RCA, Victor, and Honeywell. 82 Eventually the team decided for a Control Data Corporation (CDC) ‗lower 3000 series' as CDC made the best offer when it proposed installing a 3300 at the price of smaller 3100. 83 Both of these had been initially released in 1965 in the USA. CDC had also promised to build up 79 capabilities to deliver a highly reliable and swift engineering support for Mexican companies. 88 This as a way to using the machine as a ‗sign of modernity' given that it would be placed right in the front entrance and across the hall from the elevator bank (leading to Quintana's office). Quintana finally warmed to the idea of a new computer as a ‗marketing device' and agreed to the replacement.
The new machine started working on February 1970. 89 This computer together with the 130 staff that built around it was then claimed to be one of the top ten computer capabilities in Mexico. 90 To cater for the new computer the ground floor at Mineria 145 had been set up it in terms of power, temperature, humidity and dust control. Cables that brought power and connected peripherals were hidden from view behind false flooring and ceilings. CDC not only supervised but also financed the cost of fitting the room for the computer. This cost was to be repaid to CDC as part of the monthly rental fee. Staff was initially housed in the mezzanine floor overlooking the glass plated computer area (but eventually re-located to the basement just below the computer). As mentioned, new staff had been hired and, as had been the case in the US and elsewhere, PSI quickly found out that the combination of speedy growth, staff turnover and poor documentation resulted in administrative mayhem. 92 Moreover, new graduates within the 35 or so programming and computer operating staff were keen to learn new computer languages (such as IBM's APL) and interpret a business situation through that lens regardless of whether that was any resemblance to the real world.
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As opposed to the situation of the initial team at Aereofoto, where everyone knew about every aspect of running the computer, the increase in staff numbers allowed for specialization within the computer team (with some focusing on the operating system, others on computer operation, managing data input, the payroll system, engineering applications, etc.). In other words, administrative functions were created while a proper organizational system was built around the new computer and the services it offered. 94 Isolating computer staff and equipment behind physical as well as organization walls was a bit of a shock for some, particularly to those who had more intimate contact with computer equipment at university.
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Interestingly, at the time of signing the computer leasing contract Quintana questioned but did not overruled the team's decision to deploy a CDC. When learning of the reasons why the team failed to continue using IBM, Quintana opined:
‗You know better, but for us in the construction business its -Caterpillar, Caterpillar and Caterpillar‖.
Each time we have selected a brand other than Caterpillar because it seems cheaper, we always regret it because we do not receive the same maintenance service, there are no spares, poor technical engineering assistance, etc. So eventually it turns out to be more expensive. Are you then sure of the decision [to select CDC and not IBM]?'.
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With hindsight, Quintana's query turned out to be somewhat prophetic as the CDC was plagued with problems. Everyone regretted the deployment of the CDC. 97 Initially the CDC seem to have been the right choice as it would require only a couple of hours to run the same process that took a day at the 1130. 98 But failures were very frequent. Often were the results of poor management --installing the wrong update, operating system or software package. So ‗overflow' problems were quite common. 99 Hardware issues due to the newly introduced integrated circuit technology were rare but much more serious. For instance, the soldering of circuits onto circuit boards was prone to loosen up. 100 Another problem was that the 3300 required 400 Hz electrical power. Standard equipment included a converter from the standard 60 Hz grid power frequency in the USA, but because the feed in Mexico was 50 Hz this required the installation of a second frequency converter. 101 Problems in converting from 50 to 60 to 400 Hz was one of the most frequent (and frustrating) sources of operational failure. 102 To make matters worse CDC's Mexican engineering support and servicing teams were not to really set up to deliver on past promises. More often than not, engineers and spare parts often had to be flown in from the US and this increased the time to provide a solution. 103 This was in sharp contrast to the service IBM had provided to Aerefoto, as IBM's service engineers proved to be quite knowledgeable, available immediately at any time of day (or night) and prompt to secure spare parts. 104 Fortunately the abundant down time was compensated by a high throughput, meaning that when it actually functioned properly the CDC could quickly tackle the accumulated backlog of jobs.
run weekly payroll (manual workers at Metro organized more than one revolt in response). To make matters worse, frustrated with the slow and error prone process of key punching, Dovalí had insisted that the 3300
should have an Optical Character Recognition (OCR) device. 105 The hope was that the OCR would speed up and reduce error in data capture tasks by being more accurate and faster than punched card data entry.
But even in ideal case where volume was sufficient to use them continuously, the OCR devices of the late 1960s and 1970s could only capture half of the data on ICA's forms as a large part of the information was hand written. This short coming was made more acute by the fact that the OCR's rent was very expensive.
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Offering Computer Bureau Facilities through Joint Ventures
In 1970 Carlos Flamand was appointed general manager of PSI while Dovalí moved with some of the technical team that been part of Aereofoto on to set up a consulting and special projects company called ICATEC. 107 Piña remained at PSI with the same post, responsibilities and remuneration. 108 Teams at ICATEC and PSI then began planning to maximize the use of the CDC as well as finding new income streams. 109 The number of ‗client' companies had remained stable when migrating from the 1130 to the 3300, rather than increasing as planned.
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To address this, an external group of consultants based at Arthur D. Little de México S.A. submitted a proposal in May 1970. 111 In exchange for US$36,400 they claim to able to identifying and prioritizing areas for software development by PSI. 112 By then the PSI team had started to develop a large number of engineering and administrative applications around the 3300. However, these developments (and particularly non-engineering applications) were taking place without consultation with general managers at other firms within the group. 113 General managers of other ICA subsidiaries were not interested in outsourcing administrative procedures to the computer centre. Adding transparency to their operations would mean losing opportunities to ‗dress up' financial performance. Neither was here consensus within across the group. Not surprisingly the outsourcing of payrolls and accounting from other firms into the computer centre never materialized. This failure to develop internal markets for the new applications killed ICA's hopes of becoming a leading local provider of computer and software-related consulting services. The idea was to create three areas, focused on developing banking service applications (made out primarily from bank staff), engineering applications (made out primarily of PSI staff), and general purpose computing (staff by members of both organizations). But could the CDC 3300 could absorb applications already running on Banco del Atlántico's UNIVAC 9200 as well as serving the ‗real time, online' data transmission needs of the bank? 124 Given that operational problems were clearly evident with both the 3300 and the 9200, Piña and Sama recommended terminating contracts with both CDC and UNIVAC and migrating to either a Burroughs or preferably an IBM. 125 To study the options GSS was again brought in as an external consultant to PSI. Its report, delivered in September 1970, concluded that ‗at an unspecified future date, [the Mexican computer utility business] will become a very significant market.'. 126 Although GSS recommended renegotiating the terms of the proposed joint venture with UCC, its report urged ICA to enter the market and acquiring ‗the necessary managerial expertise' either with UCC or alone. 127 Interestingly, the report noted that the market could be serviced through ‗straight-forward batch-process systems' apparently endorsing a more traditional service bureau approach over the online timesharing model associated with computer utilities. 128 However it was other sections of the report that were to have the biggest influence on the development of data processing within ICA. The report argued for PSI to spearhead the diffusion of best practices and automation within ICA but urged that ongoing ‗consulting tasks' be stopped, redefined and deferred until after a suitable development plan was put in place. It called for a revision of staff and managerial tasks as well as a search for new technical personnel and ‗managerial talent'. 129 The report was read by ICA's top brass, rather selectively, as recommending abandoning all external activities, dropping all plans for bureau services and focusing PSI in servicing ICA's subsidiaries. stock exchange. Reporting requirements and investor expectations drove the consolidation of account control, rationalization of subsidiaries, and elimination of the incentives to general managers had to tweak reporting of internal accounting figures.
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More generally, however, this story confirms the need to consider the histories of computer use within the broader contexts of nations and industries. The development of computer usage in construction firms did not necessarily proceed along same path documented previously for banks and insurance companies. ICA's unconventional shift of the 1130 from the engineering applications for which is was designed and purchased to administrative work for which it was ill adapted was prompted by the firm's internal market, which in turn was shaped by the Mexican regulatory environment and the dominant place of public infrastructure projects in the Mexican economy. In this case ICA's structure as a web of interlocking companies encouraged its computer staff to seek out external customers, but also starved them of the resources and support needed to effectively enter the nascent markets for computer services, facilities management, or online services.
